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 Recession,  recovery and service delivery 
 Political and judicial responses to the # nancial and 
economic crisis in South Africa 
 Anashri   Pillay  and   Murray   Wesson  
 I.  Introduction 
 4 is chapter discusses the e5 ects of the global # nancial crisis on South 
Africa. It considers the economic e5 ects of the crisis and the govern-
ment’s response. It also assesses whether the crisis has had any impact 
on the judicial enforcement of economic and social rights. South Africa 
provides an interesting case study for two main reasons. First, because its 
transformative Constitution includes directly enforceable economic and 
social rights and, second, because the Constitutional Court has produced 
an in6 uential body of case-law giving e5 ect to these rights. 1 For these rea-
sons, the South African experience might seem to hold valuable lessons 
for the role that economic and social rights can play as the # nancial crisis 
continues to unfold in other parts of the world. 
 However, there are factors that complicate our inquiry. For a start, 
South Africa had high levels of economic deprivation and inequality prior 
to the # nancial crisis. 4 us, the crisis has served mainly to highlight and 
exacerbate these pre-existing problems. As well as this, the  recession in 
South Africa has been relatively shallow compared to that experienced 
by some other countries. At the time of writing the South African econ-
omy had returned to modest growth and although the South African 
government was operating in conditions of # scal constraint it had not 
 1  4 e key provisions of the Bill of Rights are Section 26 (housing), Section 27 (health care, 
food, water and social security) and Section 29 (education). 4 e Constitutional Court’s 
decisions are discussed in the body of the chapter. For a general overview see  S.  Liebenberg , 
‘South Africa: Adjudicating Social Rights under a Transformative Constitution’, in 
 M.  Langford (ed.),  Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and 
Comparative Law ( Cambridge University Press ,  2008 ), pp.  75–101 . 
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felt compelled to implement the type of austerity measures seen in many 
European countries. 
 4 e result is that it is di8  cult to discern a distinct turn in the 
Constitutional Court’s case-law in 2009, the year in which the South 
African economy entered recession, or to establish a direct causal link 
between the global # nancial crisis and any developments in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, given that all of the South African cases have 
been decided in circumstances of  deprivation and inequality – problems 
now gripping many other parts of the world to various degrees – we hope 
that our discussion can shed some light on the role that the  judicial enforce-
ment of economic and  social rights can play in times of economic crisis. 
 II.  A crisis prior to a crisis? South Africa 1990–2007 
 In order to properly understand the e5 ects of the global # nancial crisis 
on South Africa, it is necessary to provide some background and histor-
ical context. It is well-known that South Africa emerged from apartheid 
in the early 1990s with extremely high levels of poverty, inequality and 
unemployment, following decades of discriminatory provision in health, 
education and infrastructure across population groups. 4 e South African 
economy had grown at an average of only 0.8 per cent from 1985 to 1994, 2 
and the African National Congress (ANC) inherited a substantial budget 
de# cit and burgeoning  debt. 3 4 e new government was therefore faced 
with the daunting task of embarking on a project of social transformation 
in line with the new Constitution while also ensuring the  sustainability 
of state # nances. 
 In response to this challenge, the government adopted a broadly ortho-
dox macroeconomic policy, focused on # scal de# cit reduction through 
expenditure restraint and tight monetary policy, coupled with  trade lib-
eralisation. 4 is approach was embodied in the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution Programme (GEAR), a # ve-year programme adopted 
in 1996. 4 4 e objective of GEAR was to create the conditions for higher 
levels of economic growth, thereby addressing South Africa’s unemploy-
ment crisis and generating the resources necessary to provide health care, 
 2  S.  Du Plessis and  B.  Smit , ‘ South Africa’s Growth Revival A9 er 1994 ’,  Journal of African 
Economies ,  16 ( 2007 ),  668–704 , 670. 
 3  T.  Ajam and  J.  Aron , ‘ Fiscal Renaissance in a Democratic South Africa ’,  Journal of African 
Economies ,  16 ( 2007 ),  745–81 , 746. 
 4  See ‘Growth, Employment and Redistribution: A Macroeconomic Strategy’,  www. 
treasury.gov.za/publications/other/gear/chapters.pdf , last accessed 20 August 2013. 
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education and other services. According to John Weeks, it was predicted 
that GEAR would generate average growth of 4.2 per cent for 1996–2000. 5 
Weeks observes that this # gure may seem modest but was in fact ambi-
tious given the anaemic growth of the preceding years. 6 
 GEAR largely set the agenda for the ANC’s subsequent economic policy. 
As Stewart Ngandu  et al . note, there has been considerable debate about 
the advantages and disadvantages of South Africa’s macroeconomic pol-
icy. 7 On the one hand, there is no doubt that the South African economy 
achieved increased rates of  economic growth, averaging 3.1 per cent from 
1995 to 2004 and reaching 5 per cent in 2004–6. 8 4 e government made 
signi# cant progress in reducing the budget de# cit, even achieving a sur-
plus in 2007–8. 9 Progress was also made in reducing government debt, to 
just 27.1 per cent of GDP in 2006–7. 10 Finally, the adoption of  in6 ation tar-
geting in 2000 meant that from 2003 to 2007 the in6 ation rate fell within 
the 3–6 per cent target range. 11 
 For defenders of the ANC’s macroeconomic policy, these # gures 
represent signi# cant achievements that allowed for a sustainable expan-
sion of social spending, especially through the system of  social grants. 
As we shall see, defenders also argue that the government’s ‘countercycli-
cal’  economic policy – whereby surpluses are run in good years – meant 
that South Africa was in a stronger position than it would otherwise have 
been when the waves of the global # nancial crisis reached its shores. 4 e 
net result was that South Africa did not need to seek external # nancial 
support from the International Monetary Fund. Nor has South Africa 
had to adopt austerity measures, although in its most recent budget the 
 5  J.  Weeks , ‘ Stuck in Low GEAR? Macroeconomic Policy in South Africa, 1996–98 ’, 
 Cambridge Journal of Economics ,  23 ( 1999 ),  795–811 , 796. 
 6  Ibid . 
 7  S. Ngandu, M. Altman, C. Cross, P. Jacobs, T. Hart and I. Matshe, ‘4 e Socio-Economic 
Impact of the Global Downturn on South Africa: Responses and Policy Implications’ 
(2010), xvi,  www.hsrc.ac.za/en/research-outputs/view/5390 , last accessed 20 
August 2013. 
 8  Du Plessis and Smit, ‘South Africa’s Growth Revival A9 er 1994’, 670. 
 9  Department of National Treasury, ‘South African National Budget 2008: Overview of 
the 2008 Budget’, 4,  www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2008/review/
chap1.pdf , last accessed 9 January 2014. 
 10  Department of National Treasury, ‘South African National Budget 2007: Overview of 
the 2007 Budget’, 16,  www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2007/review/
chap1.pdf , last accessed 9 January 2014. 
 11  J.  Aron and  J.  Muellbauer , ‘ Review of Monetary Policy in South Africa since 1994 ’,  Journal 
of African Economies ,  16 ( 2007 ),  705–44 . 
9781107043251c11_p335-365.indd   337 6/3/2014   7:07:03 PM
Anashri Pillay and Murray Wesson338
 government has indicated that  # scal constraints mean that growth in 
 spending will be ‘moderated’ over the next three years. 12 
 On the other hand, for many commentators South Africa is a prime 
example of the failure of neo-liberal economic policies. It is not dif-
# cult to # nd fault with the ANC’s economic track record. For a start, 
even though the South African economy achieved a prolonged period 
of growth, many observers have noted that the # gures are not especially 
impressive by global standards. 13 As well as this, only modest progress 
was made in addressing South Africa’s deep-rooted structural problems 
of poverty,  inequality and unemployment. 4 e 2011 census reveals that 
although the  income of black households increased by 170 per cent over 
the preceding decade, their annual income is still only one-sixth that of 
white households. 14 In respect of  income inequality, South Africa remains 
one of the most unequal societies in the world. 15 By some standards, the 
country has even moved backwards since 1994. For example, from 1995 
to 2003 the unemployment rate rose from 17 per cent to 28 per cent on a 
narrow de# nition and from 29 per cent to a staggering 42 per cent on a 
broad de# nition. 16 In late 2007, even before the e5 ects of the  # nancial cri-
sis had reached South Africa, unemployment had reduced somewhat but 
still stood at 24 per cent on a narrow de# nition. Although the government 
has increased social expenditure since 1994, this has not always yielded 
better outcomes. Education accounts for one-sixth of government spend-
ing but in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 
 12  Department of National Treasury, ‘South African National Budget 2013: Fiscal Policy’, 
32,  www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2013/review/chapter%203.pdf , 
last accessed 9 January 2014. 
 13  See, e.g., Du Plessis and Smit, ‘South Africa’s Growth Revival A9 er 1994’, 670. 4 e authors 
note that East Asia, for example, achieved growth rates of 6.2 per cent during 1994–2004. 
See H. Marais, ‘4 e Impact of the Global Recession on South Africa’ (17 July 2009), 
 www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_
CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/cooperation+developpment/ari115–2009 , last 
accessed 9 January 2009. 
 14  ‘South Africa’s Census: Racial Divide Continuing’,  BBC News (30 October 2012),  www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20138322 , last accessed 20 August 2013. 
 15  ‘Over the Rainbow’,  ! e Economist (20 October 2012),  www.economist.com/news/
brie# ng/21564829-it-has-made-progress-becoming-full-democracy-1994-failure-lead-
ership-means , last accessed 20 August 2013. 
 16  4 e narrow de# nition of unemployment applies a job search test whereas the broad def-
inition accepts as unemployed those who did not search for work in a four-week reference 
period but who report being available for work and say that they would accept the o5 er of 
a suitable job. See  G.  Kingdon and  J.  Knight , ‘ Unemployment in South Africa, 1995–2003: 
Causes, Problems and Policies’ ,  Journal of African Economies ,  16 ( 2007 ),  813–48 , 814. 
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South Africa ranks 132nd out of 144 countries for its standard of  primary 
education and 143rd for the quality of its mathematics and science. 17 
 It is therefore no exaggeration to say, as Isobelle Frye does, that ‘the 
crisis in South Africa existed long before its more recent international 
counterpart’ 18 and that the term ‘ economic crisis’ might be said to ‘per-
manently characterise’ the lives of many South Africans. 19 As we shall see, 
the e5 ect of the global # nancial crisis has been to amplify and entrench 
these pre-existing problems. 
 III.  ! e global " nancial crisis reaches South Africa: denial, 
response and muted recovery 
 4 ere was initially a view that the South African economy would emerge 
from the  global # nancial crisis largely unscathed. For instance, Finance 
Minister Trevor Manuel asserted con# dently in 2008 that ‘we are not look-
ing at a recession in South Africa’. 20 4 e reasons for this view are complex 
and, in retrospect, di8  cult to fathom. However, Hein Marais argues that 
a narrative of impressive growth and  economic stability had taken hold 
in government and business circles, with much emphasis placed upon 
‘sound economic fundamentals’ and South Africa’s well-regulated # nan-
cial sector. 21 
 Others were less sanguine. Early in 2009,  ! e Economist ranked South 
Africa as the most vulnerable of the larger emerging economies, taking 
into account South Africa’s large current account de# cit, short-term debt 
as a percentage of foreign exchange reserves and the ratio of banks’ loans 
to their  deposits. 22 
 As it happens, the South African economy tipped into recession in the 
same year. But it is important to see that the triggers for recession were 
very di5 erent in South Africa to developed countries in North America 
 17  ‘Over the Rainbow’. 
 18  I. Frye, ‘Responses and Alternatives: South Africa’s Response to the Crisis’, in  Perspectives: 
Political Analysis and Commentary from South Africa (2009), 8–12, 8,  www.boell.org/
downloads/Perspectives_3–09.pdf , last accessed 20 August 2013. 
 19  Ibid . 11. 
 20  W. Roelf, ‘Manuel Sees No Recession but In6 ation to Fall’,  Mail & Guardian (18 November 
2008),  http://mg.co.za/article/2008–11–18-manuel-sees-no-recession-but-in6 ation-to-
fall , last accessed 20 August 2013. 
 21  Marais, ‘4 e Impact of the Global Recession in South Africa’. 
 22  ‘Domino 4 eory: Where Could Emerging-Market Contagion Spread Next?’,  ! e 
Economist (26 February 2009),  www.economist.com/node/13184631 , last accessed 20 
August 2013. 
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and Europe. 4 e South African banking sector had only limited expos-
ure to international # nancial instruments and the  United States subprime 
 mortgage market. 4 e economic downturn in South Africa was therefore 
not caused by a banking crisis. Nor was the downturn caused by unsus-
tainable state # nances. Instead, according to Ngandu  et al ., the impact in 
South Africa mostly resulted from contagion e5 ects from developments 
in  international markets, which took the form of decreases in private cap-
ital in6 ows and commodity exports and a consequent reduction in trade 
revenues. 23 4 e mining and manufacturing sectors were the hardest hit 
by the changes in trade induced by the global downturn while there was 
a sharp out6 ow of foreign portfolio capital in late 2008 – an especially 
worrying development given that South Africa is highly reliant on  private 
capital 6 ows to # nance its current account de# cit. 24 
 4 e net result of these developments was that GDP fell by 0.7 per cent 
in the fourth quarter of 2008 and then by 7.4 per cent in the # rst quarter 
of 2009. 25 4 ese two consecutive contractions in the growth rate of GDP 
meant that South Africa entered a recession for the # rst time in 17 years. 26 
In total, from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2010, 
the South African economy shed 1.1 million jobs as a result of the reces-
sion. 27 Given that South Africa had made only incremental progress in 
addressing unemployment since 1994 there is no doubt that  job losses of 
this magnitude served only to deepen a pre-existing problem while also 
representing a ‘signi# cant setback’ for the country. 28 
 Unsurprisingly, the e5 ects of these developments on vulnerable sec-
tors of society were especially severe. Frye notes that many of the jobs 
lost have been in the semi-skilled sectors of trade, transport and min-
ing. Statistically, such workers tend to live in households that have fewer 
employed persons. It follows that the number of people dependent on the 
 income of these workers tends to be higher than in households made up 
of skilled persons. 29 4 e # nancial crisis also reached South Africa follow-
ing a period of high food and  oil prices, resulting in a ‘compound cri-
sis’. 30 From 2002 to 2007 there was a sustained decrease in food insecure 
households. However, by 2008 the intersection of high food prices and the 
 23  Ngandu  et al ., ‘4 e Socio-Economic Impact of the Global Downturn on South 
Africa’, 20. 
 24  Ibid . 21.  25  Ibid . 22.  26  Ibid . 
 27  Ibid . 32.  28  Ibid . 32. 
 29  Frye, ‘Responses and Alternatives’, 8. 
 30  Ngandu  et al ., ‘4 e Socio-Economic Impact of the Global Downturn on South 
Africa’, vii. 
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recession resulted in an increase in food insecure households, especially 
for lower-income households. 31 Female-headed households in traditional 
huts and  informal settlements were disproportionately a5 ected, with 
roughly 20 per cent of female-headed households reporting that adults 
in the family had experienced  hunger in the last year compared to 15 per 
cent of male-headed households. 32 
 A9 er some initial denials, how did the South African government 
respond to these unfolding problems? At a # scal level, the government’s 
response was to initially increase spending, coupled to lower increases in 
spending in the years therea9 er in an attempt to ensure sustainability. 
Some of these spending increases had been planned in advance. In 2007 
the government had already committed to increasing the value and scope 
of the  various social grants. 33 4 e 2010 budget therefore extended the eli-
gibility criteria for the child support grant, resulting in an increased allo-
cation of R9.4 billion over a three-year period. 34 Other spending increases 
were in keeping with the government’s countercyclical economic policy 
and represented an attempt to stimulate the economy. For example, the 
2010 budget allocated R52 billion for an expanded public works pro-
gramme. 35 Overall, the 2010 budget resulted in government’s share of 
GDP rising from 28.5 per cent in 2007–8 to 34.1 per cent in 2009–10. 4 e 
budget as a whole increased by 8.6 per cent with social services receiving 
54 per cent of government spending, an increase of 9.3 per cent relative to 
2009–10. 36 For Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, this was testament to 
the government’s prudent macroeconomic policy: ‘We entered the recent 
recession with a healthy # scal position and a comparatively low level of 
debt. 4 is allowed us to maintain government spending despite a sharp 
deterioration in revenue.’ 37 
 However, questions can be raised about the sustainability of  government 
spending in the years ahead. In the 2009 # nancial year,  revenue decreased 
 31  Ibid . 66.  32  Ibid . 70.  33  Ibid . 147. 
 34  Department of National Treasury, ‘National Budget Review’ (2010), 104,  www.treas-
ury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2010/review/default.aspx , last accessed 20 
August 2013. 
 35  Minister of Finance, ‘Budget Speech 2010’ (17 February 2010),  www.treasury.gov.za/doc-
uments/national%20budget/2010/speech/speech2010.pdf , last accessed 20 August 2013. 
Although by the Minister of Finance’s own admission public works create only ‘short-
term job opportunities’. 
 36  Ngandu  et al ., ‘4 e Socio-Economic Impact of the Global Downturn on South 
Africa’, 129. 
 37  Minister of Finance, ‘Budget Speech 2011’ (23 February 2011),  www.treasury.gov.za/ 
documents/national%20budget/2011/speech/speech2011.pdf , last accessed 20 August 2013. 
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by 9 per cent or R34 billion while expenditure increased by R127 billion. 38 
4 e result was that the budget balance swung from a surplus of 1 per cent 
of GDP in 2007–8 to a de# cit of 7.3 per cent in just two years. 39 4 e most 
recent 2013 budget estimated that the  budget de# cit had reduced to 5.2 per 
cent of GDP. 40 Nevertheless, it should be clear that the South African gov-
ernment is acting in a tight # scal environment. Indeed, in the 2013  budget 
the government announced that  growth in spending would be curbed by 
R10.4 billion over the next three years and its contingency reserves would 
be reduced by R23.5 billion over the medium term. 41 Although no longer 
in recession, South Africa continues to be plagued by weak economic 
growth, with a recent report from the African Development Bank rank-
ing the country 48th out of 52 countries in terms of economic outlook. 42 
Should there be a further  downturn the ability of the South African gov-
ernment to stimulate a  recovery would be severely limited. 
 As far as monetary policy is concerned, prior to the crisis the South 
African in6 ation rate had exceeded the target range of 3–6 per cent, 
reaching a high of 13.7 per cent in 2008. 43 4 e Reserve Bank therefore 
raised the repurchase (repo) rate to a high of 12 per cent in an attempt 
to contain  in6 ation. 44 However, with the onset of the recession in 2008 
the Reserve Bank adopted a more accommodating monetary policy and 
lowered the repo rate to 7 per cent in December 2008. 45 4 e repo rate cur-
rently stands at 5 per cent while the in6 ation rate is just within the target 
range of 3–6 per cent at 5.3 per cent. 46 Given the low exposure of South 
African banks to  United States # nancial instruments, the Reserve Bank 
has not had to engage in policies such as ‘quantitative easing’ whereby 
central banks inject money into the economy. 47 
 38  Ngandu  et al ., ‘4 e Socio-Economic Impact of the Global Downturn on South 
Africa’, 127. 
 39  Minister of Finance, ‘Budget Speech 2010’. 
 40  Department of National Treasury, ‘South African National Budget 2013: Fiscal Policy’. 
 41  Ibid . 
 42  ‘South Africa’s Economy, Muddle through Will No Longer Do’,  ! e Economist (1 June 
2013),  www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21578692-slow-growth-and-
sliding-currency-are-alarming-symptoms-deeper , last accessed 9 January 2014. 
 43  South African Reserve Bank, ‘Targets and Results’,  www.resbank.co.za/MonetaryPolicy/
DecisionMaking/Pages/TargetsResult.aspx , last accessed 9 January 2014. 
 44  South African Reserve Bank, ‘Rates’,  www.resbank.co.za/Research/Rates/Pages/Rates-
Home.aspx , last accessed 9 January 2014. 
 45  Ibid . 
 46  South African Reserve Bank, ‘Targets and Results’. 
 47  Ngandu  et al ., ‘4 e Socio-Economic Impact of the Global Downturn on South 
Africa’, 134. 
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 A # nal aspect of the South African response to the  global # nancial 
crisis that should be mentioned is that in early 2009 the government, 
organised labour, business and community organisations established 
the  Framework for South Africa’s Response to the International Economic 
Crisis . 48 4 e Framework prioritised 12 areas of work including a training 
layo5  scheme for  workers at risk of  retrenchment, support for distressed 
sectors of the economy and an expanded public works programme. 
 4 e South African economy emerged from recession in 2010 and 
achieved modest growth rates of 2.3 per cent in 2012 and a projected 
2.1 per cent in 2013. 49 In a sense, South Africa has therefore been for-
tunate. South Africa has not had to recapitalise its  banks or cut  spend-
ing on social programmes. However, the position remains precarious. 
Although the European Union is no longer South Africa’s main trading 
partner – that position is now occupied by  China – a further European 
crisis would have highly detrimental knock-on e5 ects for the South 
African economy. 50 
 It is also important to emphasise the point made earlier in this chapter. 
Even before the  # nancial crisis reached South Africa, the country su5 ered 
from exceptionally high rates of poverty, inequality and unemployment. 
South Africa might have been spared the worst of the global # nancial cri-
sis but there is no doubt that these underlying structural problems have 
been deepened and entrenched, with fewer resources available to the 
South African government for such issues to be addressed and decreased 
prospects for  economic growth. Indeed, the global # nancial crisis limits 
South Africa’s possibilities at a time when the country has been described 
as being in a state of malaise, resulting from industrial strife, failure of 
government services and ine5 ective political leadership. 51 4 e question 
is to what extent, if any, the negative repercussions of the  global # nan-
cial crisis have # ltered through to the economic and social rights case-law 
produced by the courts. It is to this issue that we now turn. 
 48  ‘Framework for South Africa’s Response to the International Economic Crisis’ (19 
February 2009),  www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=96381 , last accessed 20 
August 2013. 
 49  H. Nyambura-Mwaura, ‘South Africa Slashes 2013 GDP Growth Forecast to 2.1%’, 
 Reuters (21 October 2013)  www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/23/safrica-budget-growth-
idUSL5N0ID2FL20131023 , last accessed 9 January 2014. 
 50  N. Bauer, ‘It Gets Worse: SA Economy Headed for Troubled Waters’,  Mail & Guardian 
(14 June 2012),  http://mg.co.za/article/2012–06–13-sa-economy-headed-for-troubled-
waters , last accessed 20 August 2013. 
 51  ‘Over the Rainbow’. 
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 IV.  Adjudicating economic and social rights in a recession: 
case-law from 2009 
 4 e  South African Constitutional Court has produced a well-known series 
of cases –  Soobramoney , 52  Grootboom , 53  Treatment Action Campaign 54 and 
 Khosa 55 – dealing with the  positive obligations imposed by economic and 
social rights. Early commentary focused on de# ning the Court’s approach 
and suggesting more robust alternatives to that approach. Some schol-
ars praised the jurisprudence as evidence that courts may play a useful 
role in implementing economic and social rights whilst, at the same time, 
respecting the expertise and democratic mandate of the other branches 
of government. 56 Others saw the Court’s reasonableness-based approach 
as a weak device which stood little chance of ful# lling the transformative 
promise of the key economic and social rights provisions. 57 Even these 
commentators, however, expressed approval for aspects of the Court’s rea-
soning. 58 Concerns about the practical e5 ect of the judgments were rife 
but, for most commentators, and for  civil society organisations thinking 
about strategies to implement the rights, these concerns highlighted the 
fact that courts are only one tool in the struggle to ful# l rights. 
 In some later cases, the Court indicated that it saw its role as a man-
agerial one, that creative judicial remedies were possible and appropri-
ate and that the goals of participatory democracy would inform judicial 
approaches to the rights. 59 In  Olivia Road , 60 for instance, the Court had 
 52  Soobramoney v.  Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC). 
 53  Government of the Republic of South Africa v.  Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
 54  Minister of Health v.  Treatment Action Campaign (No. 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC). 
 55  Khosa and Others v.  Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC). 
 56  See, e.g.,  C.  Sunstein ,  Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do ( Oxford University 
Press ,  2001 ), p.  221 . See also  C.  Steinberg , ‘ Can Reasonableness Protect the Poor? A Review 
of South Africa’s Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence’ ,  South African Law Journal ,  123 
( 2006 ),  264–84 ;  M.  Wesson , ‘ Grootboom and beyond: Reassessing the Socio-Economic 
Jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court ’,  South African Journal on 
Human Rights ,  20 ( 2004 ),  284–308 . 
 57  See, e.g.,  D.  Bilchitz ,  Poverty and Fundamental Rights: ! e Justi" cation and Enforcement 
of Socio-Economic Rights ( Oxford University Press ,  2007 ) ch. 5;  M.  Pieterse , ‘ Coming to 
Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights’ ,  South African Journal on 
Human Rights ,  20 ( 2004 ),  383–417 , 407. 
 58  See  D.  Bilchitz , ‘ South Africa: Right to Health and Access to HIV/AIDS Drug Treatment ’, 
 International Journal of Constitutional Law ,  1 ( 2003 ),  524–34 , 530–1; Pieterse, ‘Coming 
to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights’, 402–3. 
 59  See  Port Elizabeth Municipality v.  Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 39. 
 60  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v.  City of 
Johannesburg and Others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC). 
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issued an interim order that the City of Johannesburg should engage 
meaningfully with some 400 people that it wished to evict from unsafe 
and unhygienic buildings. 4 e judgment a8  rmed the principle that where 
people face  homelessness due to an eviction, public authorities should 
engage reasonably and in good faith with the occupiers with a view to 
# nding solutions to their dilemma. Objectives of the engagement process 
should include, for instance, determining what the consequences of the 
eviction might be and whether the City could help in alleviating those 
consequences. 61 In  Olivia Road the engagement process was marked by 
good faith on both sides 62 and resulted in a signi# cant amount of agree-
ment between the parties on the issues in the case. It is possible to see 
this as yet further evidence of an approach # xated with procedure rather 
than the substantive content of the rights. But commentators have seen 
the potential value of the  meaningful engagement idea. Both scholars and 
activists were quick to suggest ways in which the remedy could be usefully 
developed – by combination with a  supervision order, for example. 63 
 Two cases decided in 2009 –  Joe Slovo 64 and  Mazibuko 65 – attracted 
criticism of a more serious kind. 4 e hope that the Court could develop 
its reasonableness model of economic and social rights adjudication to 
interrogate governmental action more closely and the early partici-
patory promise of meaningful engagement orders were both severely 
undermined by these decisions. 4 e principal concern for this chapter 
is to assess whether these cases represent a judicial response to the glo-
bal economic and # nancial crisis. 4 e timing is signi# cant –  Joe Slovo 
was decided shortly a9 er the President had o8  cially acknowledged that 
the South African economy had entered into a recession.  Mazibuko was 
heard and decided some months a9 er this. 66 We begin this section of the 
 61  Ibid . para 14 ( per Van der Westhuizen J). 
 62  Stuart Wilson refers to the ‘almost comprehensive surrender on the City’s part’ when 
it came to framing the settlement, which was the product of the engagement process 
ordered by the court. See  S.  Wilson , ‘ Litigating Housing Rights in Johannesburg’s Inner 
City: 2004–2008 ’,  South African Journal on Human Rights ,  27 ( 2011 ),  127–51 , 150. 
 63  See  B.  Ray , ‘ Proceduralisation’s Triumph and Engagement’s Promise in Socio-Economic 
Rights Litigation ’,  South African Journal on Human Rights ,  27 ( 2011 ),  107–26 ;  A.  Pillay , 
‘ Toward E5 ective Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: 4 e Role of Meaningful 
Engagement ’,  International Journal on Constitutional Law ,  10 ( 2012 ),  732–55 . 
 64  Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v.  ! ubelisha Homes and Others 2009 (9) 
BCLR 847 (CC). 
 65  Mazibuko and Others v.  City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC). 
 66  Nokotyana and others v.  Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality and Others 2010 (4) BCLR 
312 (CC) may be included in this group of cases but is not discussed here as it does not 
add anything to the analysis below. For a detailed examination of the case, see  J.  Dugard , 
9781107043251c11_p335-365.indd   345 6/3/2014   7:07:03 PM
Anashri Pillay and Murray Wesson346
chapter with a brief analysis of the two cases. We then move on to discuss 
the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence with a view to considering how, if 
at all, the crisis has impacted the Court’s model of economic and social 
rights adjudication. 
 A.  Meaningful engagement diluted 
 In  Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v.  ! ubelisha Homes , 
residents of the Joe Slovo settlement in the Western Cape resisted their 
eviction on several grounds. Government had targeted the settlement for 
reconstruction as part of its Breaking New Ground housing policy aimed 
at  eliminating informal settlements country-wide. 67 4 e residents com-
plained that government had breached an agreement that 70 per cent of 
the new houses in the development would be allocated to eligible Joe Slovo 
residents. Furthermore, rentals in the # rst phase of the development were 
considerably higher than the governmental estimates. 68 And residents 
objected to moving to Del9 , the area designated for temporary relocation, 
because of reports of a high crime rate, poor transport services and few 
employment prospects in the area. 69 4 e applicants wanted the Court to 
hand down an order for further engagement between the parties, rather 
than eviction, at this stage. 70 
 4 e Court handed down a unanimous order, allowing for the evic-
tion of the Joe Slovo residents. 4 e eviction was made conditional on 
their relocation to temporary residential units which had to comply 
with certain speci# cations regarding size and quality. 4 e parties were 
ordered to engage meaningfully with each other to try to reach agree-
ment on the scheduling of the relocations and the respondents agreed 
to set aside 70 per cent of the houses yet to be built to eligible Joe Slovo 
residents. 71 
‘Urban Basic Services: Rights, Reality and Resistance’, in  M.  Langford ,  B.  Cousins ,  J. 
 Dugard and  T.  Madlingozi (eds.),  Symbols or Substance: ! e Role and Impact of Socio-
Economic Rights Strategies in South Africa ( Cambridge University Press ,  2013 ) p.  33 . See 
also Ray’s comments on  Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA and another v.  Premier of 
KwaZulu-Natal and others 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) in ‘Proceduralisation’s Triumph and 
Engagement’s Promise in Socio-economic Rights Litigation’, 108. 
 67  Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v.  ! ubelisha Homes and Others ,. para. 
25 ( per Yacoob J). 
 68  Ibid . paras. 32–33 ( per Yacoob J). 
 69  Ibid . para. 31 ( per Yacoob J), para. 222 ( per Ngcobo J). 
 70  Ibid . para. 316 ( per O’Regan J), para. 401 ( per Sachs J). 
 71  Ibid . para. 7. 
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 All the judges acknowledged that there were serious de# ciencies in 
the process of engagement. 72 Justice O’Regan actually held that there had 
been no meaningful engagement. 73 But they found that these 6 aws were 
not so serious as to render the governmental action unreasonable. 
 One of the main reasons why the residents were arguing for a further 
 process of engagement was that they wanted the upgrade to be conducted 
whilst they remained on site, allowing them to avoid the distress of 
relocation.  In situ upgrading was stressed in government’s Breaking New 
Ground housing plan and was consistent with international best practice 74 
but the judges held that it was reasonable for government to opt for reloca-
tion in this case, noting that this was a matter over which the government 
exercised a wide  discretion. 75 4 ere is little explanation for the choice of 
relocation in the judgment – simply a contention by the respondents that 
 in situ upgrading would not be feasible. 76 
 4 e Court’s approach was problematic in a number of respects. For one 
thing, the delays, rising costs and miscalculations 77 associated with the 
N2 Gateway housing project were not primarily a consequence of a lack 
of cooperation by the residents. 4 ese problems arose directly from 6 aws 
in the project. 78 4 e judges allowed the State’s nominal acceptance of the 
need for meaningful engagement and the overall worthiness of the pro-
ject 79 to outweigh concerns about its impact on the residents. 4 e argu-
ment that other, a5 ected parties – particularly those who had already 
moved to Del9  and were waiting to be allocated permanent housing – had 
also to be considered was, on the face of it, very convincing. 80 However, 
the idea that an order allowing for eviction of the residents would speed 
things up rested on the assumption that the primary cause of the delay 
was the residents’ unwillingness to move. As discussed above, this was 
not the case. 
 On 24 August 2009, the Court decided to stay the execution of its evic-
tion order in  Joe Slovo until further notice. 81 4 e decision was a response 
 72  Ibid . para. 167 ( per Moseneke DCJ), paras. 113, 117 ( per Yacoob J), para. 247 ( per Ngcobo J), 
para. 301( per O’Regan J), para. 378 ( per Sachs J). 
 73  Ibid . para. 301. ( per O’Regan J).  74  Ibid . paras. 364, 367 ( per Sachs J). 
 75  Ibid . para. 113 ( per Yacoob J), para. 174 ( per Moseneke DCJ), para. 253 ( per Ngcobo J), 
para. 295 ( per O’Regan J), para. 367 ( per Sachs J). 
 76  Ibid . para. 253. ( per Ngcobo J).  77  Ibid . paras. 371–2 ( per Sachs J). 
 78  Ibid paras. 371–2 ( per Sachs J), para. 295 ( per O’Regan J). 
 79  Ibid para. 302 ( per O’Regan J), para. 380 ( per Sachs J). 
 80  Ibid . para. 303 ( per O’Regan J), para. 392 ( per Sachs J). 
 81  P. de Vos, ‘Sanity and Humanity Prevails – For Now’,  Constitutionally Speaking (8 September 
2009),  http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/sanity-and-humanity-prevails-for-now/ , last 
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to the Western Cape government’s acknowledgement that the  relocation 
of Joe Slovo residents could end up costing more than the  in situ upgrad-
ing of the settlement. Furthermore, the N2 Gateway Project would not 
o5 er enough houses to accommodate all the original Joe Slovo residents 
and there was no plan for those people le9  behind in the temporary reloca-
tion area. 82 
 It is possible to read the  Joe Slovo decision as a narrative of success 
for the notion of meaningful engagement – a9 er all, the government’s 
ultimate capitulation resulted from the further engagement ordered by 
the Court. And the conditions imposed on the evictions by the Court 
highlighted the 6 aws in the project. From the perspective of the develop-
ment of the Court’s jurisprudence, however, it is di8  cult not to see this 
case as a retreat from an engagement remedy informed by the values of 
accountability, equality and participation. 83 4 e case made it clear that 
meaningful engagement was not a condition for  governmental action. 
And the Court refused to attach the requirement of further engagement 
to a  supervision order. Consequently, whether or not governmental bod-
ies comply with the  meaningful engagement requirement depends on fac-
tors like the extent to which the community involved is supported by a 
well-resourced, powerful  civil society organisation with the wherewithal 
to place continued pressure on governmental bodies. 84 
 B.  Mazibuko : reasonableness rede" ned? 
 4 e  litigation in the  Mazibuko case arose in the context of Johannesburg 
Water’s Operation Gcin’amanzi (to save water) Plan. 85 Johannesburg 
Water decided to overhaul the system of water provision, starting with 
Phiri Township in Soweto. 4 e plan was not directly prompted by the 
 recession but its aims – ‘to reduce unaccounted for water, to rehabilitate 
the water network, to reduce water demand and to improve the rate of 
accessed 20 August 2013; A. Majavu, ‘Evictions Suspended: Shack Dwellers Reprieved’, 
 ! e Sowetan (4 September 2009),  www.sowetanlive.co.za/sowetan/archive/2009/09/04/
evictions-suspended , last accessed 20 August 2013. 
 82  Majavu, ‘Evictions Suspended.’ See also Q. Mtyala, ‘New Bricks for N2 Gateway’,  IOL 
News (2 March 2011),  www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/new-bricks-for-
n2-gateway-1.1034716 , last accessed 20 August 2013. 
 83  Pillay, ‘Toward E5 ective Economic and Social Rights Adjudication’;  S.  Fredman ,  Human 
Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties ( Oxford University Press ,  2008 ), 
p.  103 . 
 84  Pillay, ‘Toward E5 ective Economic and Social Rights Adjudication’. 
 85  Mazibuko and Others v.  City of Johannesburg , para. 13 ( per O’Regan J). 
9781107043251c11_p335-365.indd   348 6/3/2014   7:07:03 PM
Recession, recovery and service delivery 349
payment’ 86 – have clear resonance in the a9 ermath of the  # nancial cri-
sis, both in South Africa and elsewhere. 4 e Phiri applicants alleged that 
the City’s policy of allocating 6 kilolitres of free water per household per 
month (amounting to approximately 25 litres per person per day in areas 
such as Phiri where households are large) was unreasonable. 4 e appli-
cants wanted the Court to quantify the amount of water that would be 
considered ‘su8  cient’ under Section 27(1)(b) as 50 litres per person per 
day, and determine whether the State had acted reasonably in seeking to 
achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 87 
 4 e Court stated that # xing a quanti# ed content to the right of access 
to su8  cient water could be a ‘rigid and counter-productive’ way of deal-
ing with the right. An approach based on reasonableness, in contrast, 
allowed for the Court to take account of variations in context and time in 
adjudicating economic and social rights. 88 According to O’Regan J, for a 
unanimous court, the government’s duty in respect to these rights was to 
take reasonable and progressive action to secure the ‘basic necessities of 
life’ to all citizens. 89 And rights-holders were entitled to hold government 
accountable for the manner in which it chose to do this. 90 4 e content of 
the right had to be determined in light of the content of the obligations set 
out in Section 27(2). 91 4 e parameters of a reasonableness-based approach 
were de# ned most clearly in this case – and the de# nition was consciously 
very narrow. 92 
 One of the main considerations weighing against acceptance of the 
applicants’ argument in the Court’s decision was the # nding that the 
expert evidence did not provide a single, clear answer to the question of 
what constituted ‘su8  cient water’ in the context of this case. 4 is was a 
debate the Court felt ill-equipped to settle. 93 But the disagreement was 
based on the fact that the amount of 50 litres per person per day included 
 86  Ibid . 
 87  For a summary of the arguments the applicants made against the Plan, see  ibid . para. 
44. 4 e facts of the case are complex – for a more detailed discussion see M. Wesson, 
‘Reasonableness in Retreat? 4 e Judgment of the South African Constitutional Court in 
 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg ’,  Human Rights Law Review , 11 (2011), 390–405. 
 88  Mazibuko and Others v.  City of Johannesburg , para. 60. 
 89  Ibid . para. 59.  90  Ibid . para. 59.  91  Ibid . para 68. 
 92  Sandra Liebenberg notes that the court’s approach, as described in  Mazibuko , is pri-
marily a ‘process-oriented approach to reasonableness review’. See  S.  Liebenberg ,  Socio-
Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution ( Claremont :  Juta , 
 2010 ), p.  471 . See in particular  Mazibuko and Others v.  City of Johannesburg , paras. 
67, 71. 
 93  Mazibuko and Others v.  City of Johannesburg , para. 62. 
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water-borne sanitation, which was relevant to the case. Furthermore the 
experts relied upon by the State indicated that the amount of 25 litres per 
person per day entailed a ‘ “high” level of health concern’. 94 
 Justice O’Regan found that, based on average household sizes, the exist-
ing free basic water allocation was su8  cient for 80 per cent of households 
in Johannesburg, even if ‘su8  cient water’ were taken to mean 50 litres 
per person per day. 95 But, as she recognised in the judgment, the average 
household size in the townships of Johannesburg was higher than that in 
the rest of the city. O9 en, more than one household relied on the same 
water connection. Sometimes, this meant that 20 people, rather than the 
average of 3.2 people, were dependent on one source for their supply of 
water. 96 
 4 e applicants also challenged government’s decision to install pre-
paid meters for the applicants and others in their position. 4 ere were 
three levels of service provision under Johannesburg Water’s Operation 
Gcin’amanzi (to save water) Plan: ‘4 e # rst level is the most basic and con-
sists of a communal tap and communal ventilated pit latrines; the second 
level is a yard standpipe and a sewer connection or shallow communal 
sewer system with a pour-6 ush toilet; and the third level is a full metered 
water connection on each stand and a conventional water-borne sewer-
age system.’ 97 Residents of Phiri Township were not given the option of 
a credit meter system. 98 4 ere were disadvantages associated with the 
credit meter system: customers with credit meters paid higher tari5 s for 
water supply than those with pre-paid meters; interest could be charged 
for arrear payments; defaulters’ names could be registered with the credit 
bureau; 99 and, of course, water supply could be cut o5 , as a consequence 
of non-payment. However, the discontinuation of the water supply could 
only be e5 ected a9 er o8  cials had complied with a range of requirements 
ensuring a  fair procedure. 100 With the pre-paid connections, water supply 
would stop once the free basic water supply had been exhausted, unless 
and until the consumer purchased credit for further water supply. 101 
 4 e Court ruled that the municipality did not need to provide pre-paid 
customers with reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before 
 94  See ‘Heads of Argument Submitted by the  Amicus Curiae , the Centre for Housing Rights 
and Evictions’, para 83,  www.wits.ac.za/# les/res922904ce301243159e1c40e81148b21c.
pdf , last accessed 20 August 2013. 
 95  Mazibuko and Others v.  City of Johannesburg , para. 89. 
 96  Ibid . para. 87.  97  Ibid . para. 107. 
 98  Ibid . para. 155.  99  Ibid . paras. 141, 152–3. 
 100  Ibid . para. 116.  101  Ibid . para. 117. 
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their water supply was stopped. A5 ected customers would be aware of the 
fact that the water would be cut o5  once the supply was exhausted and ‘[t]
o require the City to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard each 
time a pre-paid allowance is about to expire … would be administratively 
unsustainable and in most cases serve no useful purpose’. 102 
 4 e Court relied on the municipality’s indigent persons policy as a 
kind of safety net. 103 In terms of this policy, an additional 4 kilolitres per 
month would be provided free of charge to those households registered as 
indigent. 104 In response to arguments that the extra amount should sim-
ply be extended to all, the Court held that such an approach would bene# t 
people who did not require the excess water, which would be costly and 
wasteful. 105 But the fact that only one-# 9 h of the households eligible to be 
registered as ‘indigent’ were actually on the register 106 is an indication that 
the introduction of the indigent persons policy was ine5 ective. 4 e bur-
den of knowing about, and following, a complex application procedure 
to be included on the register should not be placed on vulnerable people 
with few resources. 
 However one analyses it, Johannesburg Water’s plan to overhaul the 
system of water provision in Phiri Township resulted in people with pre-
paid meters being limited to the free basic water allowance for potentially 
months at a time while they tried to somehow # nd the money to pay for 
additional water. As was pointed out by the  amicus curiae in the case, 
this policy applied regardless of how dire the need for water was. 107 It is 
submitted that the Court’s treatment of the equality dimension of the 
case is also unconvincing, given that the City’s plan was to introduce pre-
paid meters solely in poorer, predominantly black, areas, and not in more 
aD  uent, predominantly white areas. 108 
 But perhaps the most concerning aspect of  Mazibuko is the exceptionally 
deferential standard of review applied by the Court. We have noted already 
that the objectives underlying Operation Gcin’amanzi – for example, to 
reduce water demand and improve the rate of payment – have clear rele-
vance in the a9 ermath of the # nancial crisis, not only in South Africa but in 
other jurisdictions where governments are attempting to deliver services in 
 102  Ibid . para. 123. Compare the court’s reasoning on the notice requirement related to 
default judgments in the National Credit Act in the later  Sebola and another v.  Standard 
Bank of South Africa Ltd and another 2012 (5) SA 142 (CC); 2012 (8) BCLR 785 (CC). 
 103  Mazibuko and Others v.  City of Johannesburg , paras. 92–3. 
 104  Ibid . para. 93.  105  Ibid . paras. 99–102.  106  Ibid . para. 98. 
 107  See ‘Heads of Argument Submitted by the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions’. 
 108  For further discussion, see Wesson, ‘Reasonableness in Retreat’. 
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circumstances of  # scal constraint. On the facts of the case, the City’s object-
ives appeared to be legitimate given that the decrepit state of the existing 
water infrastructure meant that much water pumped into Soweto was 
unaccounted for, and given the culture of non-payment for services origin-
ating in the apartheid era that exists in many parts of Soweto. 109 
 However, there is little consideration in  Mazibuko of whether these 
objectives might have been pursued through less restrictive means. For 
example, the Court did not consider whether the City’s objectives might 
have been achieved through installation of conventional credit meters, 
coupled with rehabilitation of the water network and more serious 
attempts at debt recovery. Nor did the Court consider whether a univer-
salist approach to providing the extra 4 kilolitres a month would be more 
cost-e5 ective than keeping an indigent persons register, given that the 
City’s representative had indicated that the universalist system would be 
cheaper to administer. 110 
 Governments must generally of course realise social rights within the 
scope of their available resources. In this regard, it is di8  cult for courts 
to determine the quantum of  available resources, given that this may 
implicate issues such as levels of taxation and borrowing where  judi-
cial legitimacy and expertise are limited. 111 It is also di8  cult for courts 
to second-guess policies adopted in response to resource constraints. 
However, courts can be vigilant to ensure that such policies do not impact 
disproportionately on vulnerable sectors of society, especially where less 
restrictive alternatives exist. In  Mazibuko , the vulnerability of the group 
in question, and the fact that Operation Gcin’amanzi implicated not only 
the right of access to su8  cient water but also the right to equality, means 
that the reasonableness standard should have hardened so as to include 
an element of proportionality. 112 
 However, as with  Joe Slovo , the outcome of the litigation does not pro-
vide a complete picture regarding the vindication of the right to water in 
the  Mazibuko case. In fact, following the case, the City of Johannesburg 
decided to raise the amount of water provided free to the poorest 
 109  Mazibuko and Others v.  City of Johannesburg , paras. 10–12, 166. 
 110  Ibid . para. 99. 
 111  See  M  Pieterse ‘ Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic 
Rights’ ,  South African Journal on Human Rights ,  20 ( 2004 ),  383–417 , 394–5;  K  McLean 
 Constitutional Deference, Courts and Socio-economic Rights in South Africa ( Pretoria 
University Law Press ,  2009 ), pp.  195–6 ;  M  Tushnet , ‘ Social Welfare Rights and the Forms 
of Judicial Review’ ,  Texas Law Review ,  82 ( 2004 ),  1895–919 , 1896–7. 
 112  4 is argument is made at greater length in  M.  Wesson , ‘ Disagreement and the 
Constitutionalisation of Social Rights’ ,  Human Rights Law Review ,  12 ( 2012 ),  221–53 . 
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households in the city to 50 litres per person per day and took other steps 
to so9 en the impact of the installation of pre-payment meters on relevant 
households. 113 4 e litigation played a role in achieving this result because 
of the publicity it generated. But the litigation was only one feature in 
what Jackie Dugard refers to as the ‘politicisation of the ongoing process 
of engagement and contestation between  civil society and government’. 114 
Other aspects of the ‘legal mobilisation process’ included ‘meetings, 
marches, media exposure and bypass, a form of civil disobedience that 
entails removing the o5 ending technology … and connecting to the main 
water supply, thereby restoring the unlimited water supply’. 115 Residents 
were supported in this process by the Anti-Privatisation Forum and the 
new, a8  liated Coalition Against Water Privatisation. 
 Dugard and others point out that, whilst the ANC is still able to depend 
on convincing victories in national elections, the ANC government is not 
insulated from public protest. 116 In fact, some studies indicate that the 
country has ‘one of the highest  per capita rates of protest action in the 
world’. 117 Protests over failures in service delivery and communication, 
particularly at the level of  local government, have become an important 
feature of the political landscape since 2004 and mushroomed in 2009. 118 
And sustained protest action has, in combination with litigation or threat-
ened litigation, in6 uenced governmental policies and decisions. 
 Returning to the assessment of  Mazibuko , then, a wider lens provides 
evidence of the value of  litigation where that litigation is used as one of 
the tools in the struggle for rights implementation. Where local commu-
nities can draw on organised assistance and advice to place various forms 
of pressure on government, judicial decisions are more likely to have an 
important and sustained impact. But the principles articulated in the 
 Mazibuko judgment suggest a court distancing itself from the possibility 
of a more substantive, robust approach to reasonableness review in the 
context of economic and social rights. 
 C.  Assessing the cases: recession jurisprudence? 
 As noted earlier, the Constitutional Court’s 2009 decisions in the area 
of economic and social rights have attracted concerns about a possible 
 113  Dugard, ‘Urban Basic Services’, 31.  114  Ibid . 
 115  Ibid . 28.  116  Ibid . 12–18. 
 117  Marais, ‘4 e Impact of the Global Recession on South Africa’. 
 118  Dugard, ‘Urban Basic Service’, 12. 
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retreat to an approach that is much more deferential than that suggested 
in earlier cases and one that is not warranted by the judicial obligation to 
balance protection of the rights with respect for governmental decision-
making. For our purposes, these concerns raise two questions. First, did 
the 2009 cases mark a departure from the Court’s earlier jurisprudence 
and second, if so, is this shi9  connected to the # nancial and economic 
crisis? 
 For many commentators, the cases were not a departure from the 
Court’s established approach but what Brian Ray refers to as the ‘culmin-
ation of a strong trend towards the proceduralisation of socio-economic 
rights’. 119 Scholars have consistently argued that a  reasonableness-based 
approach is, by its nature, process-driven and overly deferential. 120 But 
some arguments have focused on the potential of a  reasonableness-based 
approach to protect the values underlying economic and social rights and 
to interrogate  governmental action in a robust way. Some analysis of the 
meaningful engagement idea suggests that even an ostensibly procedural 
remedy may give rise to substantive protection. 121 
 Whilst the Constitutional Court did, in its earlier jurisprudence, some-
times adopt a stance more deferential than was warranted, its reasoning 
le9  open the possibility for more serious interrogation of governmental 
policy. In cases like  Treatment Action Campaign and  Khosa , the Court 
was responsive to arguments based on the disproportionate adverse 
impact on individuals when weighted against the governmental object-
ive. 4 e Court indicated that it would enquire into the weight of submis-
sions  regarding limited resources, not simply take them at face value. 122 
4 e dicta in  Mazibuko closed down the space available to make such 
arguments.  Mazibuko was not just a highly deferential decision on the 
facts of the case. It amounted to a statement of principle, a rede# ning of 
the Court’s general approach to economic and social rights adjudication 
as light touch review. 
 4 e next question for us is whether what we have argued to be a depart-
ure from the Court’s earlier approach may be attributed to the economic 
 119  Ray, ‘Proceduralisation’s Triumph and Engagement’s Promise in Socio-Economic 
Rights Litigation’, 107. 
 120  See Bilchitz,  Poverty and Fundamental Rights ; Pieterse, ‘Coming to Terms with Judicial 
Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights’. 
 121  See Pillay, ‘Toward Effective Economic and Social Rights Adjudication’; Ray, 
‘Proceduralisation’s Triumph and Engagement’s Promise in Socio-Economic Rights 
Litigation’. 
 122  Minister of Health v.  Treatment Action Campaign (No. 2) , paras. 65–6;  Khosa and Others 
v Minister of Social Development, paras. 60–2. 
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and # nancial crisis. 4 ere are several reasons why this is a di8  cult assess-
ment to make. First, there are no overt indications in the cases that the 
judgments were informed by concerns about the country being in a reces-
sion. Second, resource scarcity is usually relevant in South African eco-
nomic and social rights cases anyway. 4 e two pivotal sections of the 
Constitution – Sections 26 and 27 – require the State to act ‘ within its avail-
able resources’ and the State has made submissions based on resource scar-
city in nearly all the cases decided in terms of those provisions thus far. In 
the later cases, those submissions have not been linked to the speci# c eco-
nomic climate of a recession. 4 ird, as the jurisprudence has developed, 
and government responds to its obligations, as de# ned in the  Constitution 
and by the Court, a greater level of complexity and more serious resource 
implications are to be expected whether the State is operating in an eco-
nomic recession or not. 4 us, for instance,  Olivia Road involved housing 
plans for a relatively small group of people whereas  Joe Slovo concerned 
a massive housing project with a corresponding huge potential impact. 
Finally, as noted earlier in this chapter, the extreme levels of poverty in 
South Africa pre-dated the # nancial and economic crisis. 4 e number of 
people living in poverty has increased and this is due, partly, to the eco-
nomic crisis. 4 e dire  living conditions of the most vulnerable have been 
exacerbated by the  economic downturn. But the crisis has served mainly to 
highlight pre-existing problems with governmental responses to  poverty. 
 In terms of what this means for the Constitutional Court’s model of 
economic and social rights adjudication, the Court has always had to bal-
ance its obligation to give e5 ect to the economic and social rights with 
respect for the more democratic nature of governmental decision-making 
and the greater expertise of certain governmental o8  cials and bodies. 
Neither the  recession nor a global climate of  economic insecurity and 
resource scarcity changes this fact. It does raise the question of whether 
the Court is getting the balance right. For the reasons described above, our 
argument is that the Court got it wrong in the 2009 cases. We turn now 
to examine post-2009 cases and consider the implications of this case-law 
for the Court’s general approach to economic and social rights. Our focus 
in the discussion below is on how the Court has treated arguments about 
resources and how it has developed the  meaningful engagement remedy. 
4 e post-2009 jurisprudence reinforces the point that the  # nancial crisis 
has had no real impact on how the South African Constitutional Court 
approaches social rights cases. However, the Court’s treatment of argu-
ments about limited resources contains valuable lessons for how courts 
adjudicate  social rights in a general context of resource scarcity. 
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 V.  Post-2009 developments in the case-law 
 4 e  Blue Moonlight 123  decision was handed down on 1 December 2011. 
4 e case considers  inter alia the impact of  resource constraints on  hous-
ing policy. Like  Mazibuko ,  Blue Moonlight is therefore clearly relevant to 
the post-recession issue of how the State should deliver services in cir-
cumstances where resources are limited, and the role that  judicial review 
can play in this regard. However, the case holds more constructive lessons 
than  Mazibuko on both counts. 
 Blue Moonlight was a private company which, in 2004, had purchased 
several buildings in a state of considerable disrepair with the intention 
of redeveloping them. 124 4 e buildings were occupied by some 86 people 
who had been living on the  property for more than six months, some of 
them for a considerably longer period. Between 1999 and 2004, they had 
also paid  rent to a caretaker claiming to act for the owner, and to two dif-
ferent letting agencies. By 2005 the buildings were in a shocking condition 
and the City of Johannesburg issued notices warning Blue Moonlight to 
deal with the safety and health issues. 4 e company then posted notices 
in the buildings giving residents approximately a month to vacate. 4 e 
notices also claimed to end any lease agreement that may have existed. 
Blue Moonlight began eviction proceedings in the High Court in 2006. At 
this stage, the occupiers of the buildings asked that the City be joined to 
the proceedings because of their obligations with respect to housing – the 
City did not object and became a party in the case. When the case even-
tually came before the Constitutional Court, one of the main legal issues 
was whether the City’s policy of excluding people evicted from private 
property from consideration for temporary housing was constitutional. 125 
4 e fact that the occupiers would be homeless if evicted from the build-
ings was undisputed in the case. 126 
 4 e City sought to argue that its obligations with respect to emergency 
accommodation were limited to applying to the provincial government 
for assistance as and when the need arose. 4 eir application for such 
 assistance had been unsuccessful and they therefore had no further duties 
with respect to the occupiers. 127 In response, the Court held that there 
was nothing in the  Grootboom decision or in Chapter 12 of the Housing 
Code to indicate that local government’s capacity to provide emergency 
 123  City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v.  Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2012 (2) BCLR 150 (CC). 
 124  Ibid . paras. 1, 8.  125  Ibid . para. 14. 
 126  Ibid . para. 47.  127  Ibid . paras. 48–9. 
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accommodation was conditional on provincial funding. Indeed, when 
the Housing Code was read in light of the broader constitutional and 
statutory framework, it was clear that the City was both entitled and 
obliged to allocate resources in the sphere of emergency housing. 128 In 
essence, this aspect of  Blue Moonlight makes clear that the central # nding 
of  Grootboom – that those in immediate and desperate need of housing 
should not be neglected – applies to all levels of government. 
 From the perspective of this chapter, an especially important argument 
advanced by the City was that it simply lacked the resources to provide 
emergency accommodation for the occupiers if they were evicted. 129 4 e 
City submitted that it could not budget for emergency accommodation 
due to the element of unpredictability, and that it was ‘not obliged to 
go beyond its available budgeted resources to secure housing for home-
less people … [r]esources not budgeted for are not available’. 130 4 e City 
argued further that although a budget surplus had been projected it was 
now in a budget de# cit. 131 
 4 e Court acknowledged that it would be wholly inappropriate for a 
court to order an organ of state to do something that was impossible and 
that the City’s assertion about a lack of resources therefore deserved ser-
ious consideration. 132 However, the Court rejected the submission that 
unpredictability precluded budgeting for emergency housing. 4 is is 
because ‘the budgetary demands for a number and measure of emergency 
occurrences are at least to some extent foreseeable …’ 133 Furthermore, it 
was not good enough for the City simply to assert that it had not budg-
eted for something, where it was legally obliged to do so. 134 4 e City had 
also not provided any documentary evidence to support its claims of a 
de# cit. 135 4 e evidence provided related to the City’s housing budget, 
rather than its overall # nancial position. 136 4 e Court was not prepared, 
in the light of this limited information, to overturn the Supreme Court 
of Appeal’s # nding that the City had not demonstrated that it could not 
a5 ord to provide the relevant emergency housing. 137 
 4 e Court went on to assess the constitutionality of the City’s policy 
of distinguishing between those relocated by the City and those evicted 
by private landlords, and providing for only the former in its tempor-
ary accommodation programme. In its analysis, the Court noted that 
state resources are limited in any country and that this was especially 
 128  Ibid . para. 53  129  Ibid . para. 71.  130  Ibid . para. 72. 
 131  Ibid . para. 73.  132  Ibid . para. 69.  133   Ibid . para. 63. 
 134  Ibid . para. 74.  135  Ibid . para. 73.  136  Ibid . para. 74.  137  Ibid . paras. 74–5. 
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so for South Africa. Section 26(2) recognises that resource constraints 
are relevant for an enquiry into the validity of housing policies and pro-
grammes. 138 4 e question was whether the di5 erentiation between those 
evicted by private landlords and those evicted by the City could stand. 139 
4 e Court held that the distinction was unreasonable inasmuch as it 
obscured the individual situations of the persons at risk and therefore did 
not meaningfully take their needs into account; 140 the City’s duty arises 
not on the basis of who carries out the eviction but rather the fact that the 
eviction may result in  homelessness. 141 
 4 e Court thus dismissed the City’s appeal. It ruled that the occupiers 
could be evicted but that the City had to provide them with tempor-
ary accommodation ‘on a date linked to the date of eviction’. 4 e Court 
ordered that the temporary housing be as close as possible to their current 
location and that it be provided 14 days before the eviction to allow the 
occupiers enough time to make the necessary moving arrangements and 
give them the security that the housing was, in fact, available to them. 142 
Although the occupiers had asked for a structural interdict in their writ-
ten submissions,  143 the Court did not  grant this, noting simply that the 
written arguments were not persuasive and had not been seriously pur-
sued during the oral argument. 144 
 Nevertheless, the importance of  Blue Moonlight lies in the Constitutional 
Court’s consideration of the relationship between constitutional obli-
gations and resource constraints. 4 e Court emphasised that resource 
constraints must be taken seriously. However, the Court will not simply 
accept assertions that, for instance, a public authority has a  de# cit. 4 e 
State is required to provide evidence supporting its assertions regarding 
resource limitations. Furthermore, even where resources are constrained, 
the State must  budget so as to ful# l its  constitutional duties. 4 e State can-
not evade its obligations to those who are most vulnerable simply by fail-
ing to allocate  resources. 4 e Court will not prescribe exactly how much 
should be budgeted for a speci# c purpose. But the Court will ensure that 
 138  Ibid . para. 86.  139  Ibid . para. 86.  140  Ibid . para. 92.  141  Ibid . para. 92. 
 142  Ibid . paras. 99–101. For the court order, see  ibid . para 104. 
 143  A structural interdict is a type of supervisory jurisdiction, ‘an injunctive remedy that 
requires the party to whom it is directed, to report back to the court, within a speci# ed 
period, the measures that have been taken to comply with the court’s orders’. See  D. 
 Davis ,  ‘Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: 4 e Record of the Constitutional Court 
a9 er Ten Years’ ,  Economic and Social Rights Review ,  5 (5) ( 2004 ),  3–7 , 4. 
 144  City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v.  Blue Moonlight Properties , para.101. 
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those constitutionally entitled to the State’s assistance are not neglected 
or excluded from the State’s social programmes. 
 In two cases immediately following  Blue Moonlight – Pheko 145 and 
 Schubart Park 146 – the State did not raise any arguments regarding budget-
ing decisions and  resource constraints. In contrast to  Blue Moonlight , the 
Court’s remedy in each of these cases included court supervision of the 
order. 147 In  Pheko , the local authority involved, Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality, sought to use the provisions of the Disaster Management 
Act 57 of 2002 to evict over 700 residents of the Bapsfontein Informal 
Settlement. 148 4 e key question was whether they could do this without 
# rst getting a court order. 149 
 4 e Court held that Section 55(2) of the Act did not allow for eviction 
or demolition of homes without a court order – only evacuation, which is 
limited to cases where temporary action is necessary for the preservation 
of life. 150 Here, there was no need for urgent evacuation. 4 e circumstances 
which gave rise to the declaration of a disaster area – the presence of sink-
holes – were # rst evident in 2004. Several reports were commissioned in 
2005 but no action was taken until 2009 when another report was com-
missioned. It was only in 2010 that the municipality started to relocate 
residents. 4 e eviction of the residents and demolition of their homes 
therefore constituted a violation of Section 26(3) of the Constitution. 151 
 4 e Court made a declaratory order that the removal was unlawful. It 
also held that the municipality had a duty to provide the residents with 
temporary accommodation on suitable land. 152 4 e municipality was 
under an  obligation to engage with the applicants meaningfully regard-
ing the identi# cation of this land. 4 e municipality had to report to the 
Court about its progress in approximately one year. 153 In ordering super-
vision, the Court noted that ‘it was uncertain how long it will take for 
the Municipality to identify land for purposes of a5 ording the applicants 
access to adequate housing. Supervisory relief is thus necessary in this 
 145  Pheko and Others v.  Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 (2) SA 598 (CC); 2012 (4) 
BCLR 388 (CC). 
 146  Schubart Park Residents Association and Others v.  City of Tshwane and Others 2012 
ZACC 26. 
 147  Pheko and Others v.  Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality , para. 50;  Schubart Park 
Residents Association and others v.  City of Tshwane and Others , para. 51. 
 148  Ibid . paras. 1, 4. 
 149  Ibid . para. 3. For the factual background, see  ibid . paras. 5–11. 
 150  Ibid . paras. 38–40.  151  Ibid . paras. 41, 45. 
 152  Ibid . para. 53 (on what ‘suitable’ temporary accommodation would amount to). 
 153  Ibid . para. 50. 
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case to enable the Municipality to report to this Court about, amongst 
other things, whether land has been identi# ed and designated to develop 
housing for the applicants’. 154 4 e Court’s reason for ordering supervision 
in  Schubart Park was similar. In this case, residents of three buildings who 
had been removed from their homes sought an order for re-occupation. 
4 e buildings in question were state-owned and, by 2011, they were occu-
pied by many people not known to the City authorities. Conditions in 
the buildings had deteriorated signi# cantly. In response to the City cut-
ting o5  the water and electricity supply, some residents engaged in protest 
action – including the lighting of # res. When two # res broke out in one of 
the blocks, the police removed the residents from that block and did not 
allow them to return once the # re had been extinguished. Some weeks 
later, residents of the other two blocks were also removed. Ultimately, 
about 3000–5000 people were either living on the streets or in temporary 
shelters by the end of September 2009. 155 
 4 e High Court handed down what the Constitutional Court referred 
to as a ‘tender implementation order’. 4 is provided that the City had a 
duty to assist the a5 ected residents by, amongst other things, providing 
temporary accommodation, beginning a process of refurbishment of the 
buildings and subsequent  relocation of the residents to the buildings and, 
if technical advice showed this was not possible, providing habitable alter-
native buildings which had to allow for ‘shelter, privacy and the amenities 
of life’. 156 
 4 e only defence presented by the City was that re-occupation was 
impossible because of the life-threatening conditions the High Court had 
found to exist, as a matter of fact, in the buildings. 4 e City conceded 
before the Constitutional Court that this defence only applied for as long 
as it was actually impossible to return the residents – in other words, 
‘immediate removal on grounds of safety and temporary impossibility’ 
could not ‘result in the permanent lawful deprivation of the occupation 
of their homes’. 157 4 e Court pointed out that any other understanding 
would be inconsistent with previous case-law. 158 4 e Court agreed with 
High Court’s # ndings that the removal was not a lawful eviction but 
action made temporarily necessary to preserve life, and that the residents 
were entitled to re-occupation once it was safe for them to return. But the 
judges objected to the  lower court’s # nding that if the buildings could not 
 154  Ibid .  155  Ibid . paras. 1–8.  156  Ibid . para. 12. 
 157  Ibid . para. 20.  158  Ibid . paras. 19–20. 
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be made safe, those who had accepted the City’s tender must be provided 
with alternative accommodation. At that stage, the action would amount 
to eviction, rather than temporary removal and eviction could not be 
e5 ected without a court order. 159 
 4 e Court also held that the High Court should have explicitly rec-
ognised the residents’ right to eventual restoration of their occupation, 
provided the buildings could be rehabilitated. 160 4 e Court noted that 
a meaningful engagement order was appropriate, not just as a means of 
securing acceptable temporary accommodation for people facing eviction 
but also in circumstances where possible restoration of occupation was at 
issue. 161 Perhaps most importantly, the Court held that the City’s tender or 
o5 er of  temporary accommodation was an ‘inadequate basis for a proper 
order of engagement’ because ‘[i]t proceeds from a “top-down” premise, 
namely that the City will determine when, for how long and ultimately 
whether at all, the applicants may return to Schubart Park’. 162 4 us, the 
Court ordered that the City and the applicants had to engage meaning-
fully broadly in order to achieve restoration of the applicants’ occupation. 
4 e parties were given slightly under two months to report to the High 
Court on their plans and progress. 4 e Court held that this supervision 
was needed because of the uncertainty regarding how long the process of 
re-occupation would take. 163 
 On the face of it then, the decision to order supervision in the latter two 
cases and not in  Blue Moonlight rested on the quality of argument put 
forward regarding supervision and the level of uncertainty on when the 
Court’s order could be implemented. At the same time, the supervisory 
element of the Court’s orders in  Pheko and  Schubart Park highlights the 
capacity of the Court to hand down more robust remedies where resource 
constraints are less of a concern. Importantly, the cases suggest that, 
where there is evidence of serious resource scarcity – whether linked to 
a global # nancial crisis or not – the courts may still play a role in, at least, 
holding government to account for its decisions. 4 us,  resource scarcity 
may in6 uence a court’s choice of remedies, rather than act as a reason for 
non-justiciability of the rights. 
 159  Ibid . para. 41.  160  Ibid . para. 49. 
 161  Ibid . para. 42.  162  Ibid . para. 50. 
 163  4 e courts speci# ed certain issues with respect to the subject matter of engagement. See 
 Schubart Park Residents Association and Others v.  City of Tshwane and Others , paras. 
51, 53. 
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 VI.  Conclusion 
 It is still too early to measure whether the experience of recession will 
result in any real changes to political and economic conditions in South 
Africa. 4 e crisis highlighted the pre-existing structural problems which 
have resulted in extreme poverty and inequality. But, in its fundamentals, 
government’s economic policy remains unchanged. And the ANC’s elect-
oral dominance suggests that a shi9  in that economic policy is extremely 
unlikely. 
 4 e increase in organised resistance to governmental policies and the 
manner in which those policies are implemented – particularly when it 
comes to basic services – is perhaps the most interesting development of 
the 2009–12 period in terms of the current and future prospects for ESR 
realisation in South Africa. As noted above, it is di8  cult to establish a dir-
ect link between the kind of protest action now common in the country 
and the # nancial crisis. 4 e protests are an expression of dissatisfaction 
over continued lack of access to basic services, and frustration over gov-
ernment’s failure to properly engage with communities about their needs. 
4 ese issues pre-dated the recession but were exacerbated by it. 
 Organised resistance has resulted in identi# able gains with respect to 
the protection of economic and social rights. 164 And litigation has proved 
to be a valuable element in the struggle for access to goods such as  hous-
ing and water. 4 e  capacity of courts to e5 ect social change is limited. 
For one thing, the social and economic rights cases decided in the courts 
represent the tip of a very large iceberg. And, most importantly, judicial 
decisions in this context have proved to be truly useful only when rein-
forced by community pressure for enforcement and further engagement. 
But, taking these considerations into account, the development of judicial 
principle continues to be an important element of social and  economic 
rights discourse in South Africa. 
 Notwithstanding the fact that South Africa entered a  recession in 2009 
as a result of the global # nancial crisis, it is di8  cult to discern a distinct 
impact on the Constitutional Court’s economic and social rights juris-
prudence. It is true that two of the cases decided in that year –  Mazibuko 
and  Joe Slovo – have been criticised for diluting the requirements of rea-
sonableness and meaningful engagement. However, the seeds for these 
developments were present in the Court’s earlier decisions. And, whilst 
 164  See, further, Dugard, ‘Urban Basic Services’;  H.  Marais ,  South Africa Pushed to the Limit: 
! e Political Economy of Change ( London and New York :  Zed Books ,  2011 ), pp.  455–7 . 
9781107043251c11_p335-365.indd   362 6/3/2014   7:07:04 PM
Recession, recovery and service delivery 363
 Mazibuko appeared to signal a more fundamental shi9  in the Court’s 
approach, subsequent developments suggest a quiet retreat from the def-
erential assumptions of that decision. 4 e # nding in  Blue Moonlight that 
government had not provided adequate support for the claim that what 
was being asked for was beyond its resource capacity is signi# cant. It is 
possible to argue that the di5 erence in the cases was really one of scale: 
 Mazibuko and, for that matter,  Joe Slovo , dealt with far greater numbers of 
people and the resource implications were therefore more serious. But the 
Court’s # nding in  Blue Moonlight that the City could not exclude people 
who had been evicted by private property-owners from its temporary 
housing programme has quite wide-ranging implications. 
 4 e Court has also adopted a more robust approach to the meaningful 
engagement remedy. Evacuation or eviction had already occurred in the 
later cases dealing with engagement so the question of whether removal 
should be made conditional on engagement did not really arise. However, 
in the  Schubart Park case, the Court’s declaratory order that the residents 
were entitled to re-occupy their homes in the buildings concerned, com-
bined with the engagement order about the details of temporary accom-
modation, etc. meant that a future eviction (if the buildings could not be 
restored) could not take place in the absence of meaningful engagement. 
Furthermore, the addition of  supervision orders to the engagement rem-
edies in  Pheko and  Schubart Park was a step toward more careful scrutiny 
of  governmental action that the Court had previously refused to take. 
 Taken as a whole, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court since 
2009 – both the more restrained and interventionist elements – cannot 
be seen to be a direct response to the economic downturn. Nevertheless, 
we should not conclude that the South African experience holds no les-
sons for the role that economic and social rights can play in times of 
economic crisis. As we have emphasised throughout this chapter, all of 
the Constitutional Court’s economic and social rights decisions have 
been reached in a context of deprivation and  inequality. In a sense, all 
of the Court’s judgments are a response to the ongoing economic crisis 
that characterises the lives of many South Africans. Decisions such as 
 Grootboom and  Blue Moonlight demonstrate that, at its best, the reason-
ableness approach is capable of holding even resource-constrained gov-
ernments to account for the steps that they have taken to realise economic 
and social rights, while also respecting the expertise and democratic cre-
dentials of executive and legislative decision-makers. 4 e di8  culty is that 
the reasonableness standard is capable of lapsing into overly deferential 
review, as illustrated by the  Mazibuko decision. However, there is now 
9781107043251c11_p335-365.indd   363 6/3/2014   7:07:04 PM
Anashri Pillay and Murray Wesson364
a considerable body of literature about how the  reasonableness standard 
can be strengthened so as to avoid this eventuality. 165 
 4 e case-law on meaningful engagement likewise emphasises the cen-
tral importance of the values of accountability, equality and participation 
in circumstances where people face eviction, and possibly more broadly 
where the State threatens to deprive people of enjoyment of economic and 
social rights. Of course, there are limitations to the Court’s meaningful 
engagement jurisprudence, some of which have been canvassed above. 
Perhaps the most damning critique is that some government o8  cials may 
use, and have used, the remedy in a cynical way. Wilson has written about 
the City of Johannesburg’s use of ‘ “engagement” to narrow the scope and 
content of its obligations toward the poor signi# cantly’. 166 To some extent 
the problem has been recognised by the Constitutional Court in their 
orders in cases such as  Blue Moonlight , where details were included about 
the conditions appropriate for temporary accommodation. 4 e cases 
decided in 2011 and 2012 are also of some  assistance because of the newly 
introduced court supervision of engagement orders. Supervision will 
go some way towards ensuring that engagement does not descend into 
a top-down exercise in information provision by governmental o8  cials. 
4 e principles elaborated in the cases following the 2009 Constitutional 
Court term have yet to be tested in the context of large-scale projects in 
the nature of the government’s Breaking New Ground housing policy or 
Operation Gcin’amanzi (to save water) Plan. 4 ey are, however, a promis-
ing development of the Court’s economic and social rights jurisprudence. 
4 ese cases add strength to the argument that adjudication is an import-
ant tool for organisations and individuals seeking to vindicate economic 
and social rights. 
 Moreover, given the fact that the South African experience of eco-
nomic and social rights adjudication is located with a context of con-
tinuing  economic insecurity, the jurisprudence speaks to the kind of 
demands that may be placed on governmental bodies in situations of very 
serious resource scarcity such as a  global # nancial crisis. Even when not 
attached to court supervision, a detailed meaningful engagement order 
may contribute to the protection of interests in housing, water provision 
and so on. And court supervision is a useful way of ensuring the integ-
rity of  meaningful engagement. 4 is is not to advocate a process-driven 
 165  For general discussion, see the articles cited in notes 57–8. For a recent contribution, see 
Wesson, ‘Disagreement and the Constitutionalisation of Social Rights’. 
 166  Wilson, ‘Litigating Housing Rights in Johannesburg’s Inner City’, 150. 
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approach to the implementation of economic and social rights, in gen-
eral. Importantly, the jurisprudence also does not suggest that  resource 
scarcity, however extreme, allows government free rein in deciding on 
best practice when it comes to  social rights. Rather, the cases discussed 
here show that the political and economic complexity, whether due to the 
nature of a particular project, or the global # nancial climate, may demand 
that courts apply a level of creativity in deciding on appropriate remedial 
action. 
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